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Time-Varying Uncertainty and the Credit Channel∗
Abstract
We extend the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) agency cost model of business cycles by including time varying
uncertainty in the technology shocks that aﬀect capital production. We ﬁrst demonstrate that standard
linearization methods can be used to solve the model yet second moment eﬀects still inﬂuence equilibrium
characteristics. The eﬀects of the persistence of uncertainty are then analyzed. Our primary ﬁndings
fall into four categories. First, it is demonstrated that uncertainty aﬀects the level of the steady-state
of the economy so that welfare analyses of uncertainty that focus entirely on the variability of output
(or consumption) will understate the true costs of uncertainty. A second key result is that time varying
uncertainty results in countercyclical bankruptcy rates - a ﬁnding which is consistent with the data and
opposite the result in Carlstrom and Fuerst. Third, we show that persistence of uncertainty aﬀects
both quantitatively and qualitatively the behavior of the economy. Finally, we demonstrate that the
magnitude of changes in uncertainty aﬀecting the economy could be quite large; the implication is that
second moment eﬀects may be an important determinant of macroeconomic behavior.
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While technology has quickened production adjustments, human nature remains
unaltered. We respond to a heightened pace of change and its associated uncertainty
in the same way we always have. We withdraw from action, postpone decisions, and
generally hunker down until a renewed, more comprehensible basis for acting emerges.
In its extreme manifestation, many economic decisionmakers not only become risk
averse but attempt to disengage from all risk.1
The last ten years has seen a proliferation of macroeconomic models that highlight the role
of ﬁnancial intermediaries in business cycle activity. With variations on this theme referred to
as models of the credit channel, agency cost models,o rﬁnancial accelerator models,t h ec o m m o n
element is that lending activity is characterized by asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders. As a consequence, interest rates may not move to clear lending markets (as in models
with moral hazard and adverse selection elements) or ﬁrms’ net worth may play a critical role
as collateral in inﬂuencing lending activity (as in models with agency costs). While debate on
the empirical support for these models continues, there is little doubt that, as a whole, they have
improved our understanding of ﬁnancial intermediation and broadened the scope of how monetary
policy, through the impact of interest rates on ﬁrms’ net worth, can inﬂuence macroeconomic
performance.2
With the central role that information plays in these models, they present a potentially rich
environment to study the eﬀects that changes in uncertainty have on aggregate economic behavior.
Of course, Chairman Greenspan, as reﬂected in the quote above, is not the ﬁrst to note that
changes in economic uncertainty and, in particular, variations in the conﬁdence one attaches to
forecasts, surely aﬀect household savings decisions as well as ﬁrms’ investment plans. For example,
Bernanke (1983), Abel (1983), Pindyck (1991) and Gilchrist and Williams (2000) all explore the
role that uncertainty has on investment decisions. In this paper, our goal is to continue this
1 Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Aﬀairs, U.S.
Senate. February 13, 2001
2 The credit channel literature is large and continues to expand. Some prominent contributions are: Williamson
(1987), Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Kiyataki and Moore (1997),
and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). Walsh (1998) presents an overview, both theoretical and empirical, of the
literature.
1exploration but to do so in an environment that also models lending activity. To do this, we
introduce time-varying uncertainty, i.e. second moment eﬀects, into the agency cost model of
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). This model is particularly attractive for our purposes since it
incorporates a lending channel (for investment) that is characterized by asymmetric information
between lenders and borrowers. In addition, the economic environment is a variant of a typical
real business cycle model so that key parameters can be calibrated to the data. Within this
setting, we model time varying uncertainty as a mean preserving spread in the distribution of
the technology shocks aﬀecting capital production and explore how changes in uncertainty aﬀect
equilibrium characteristics.
We ﬁrst demonstrate that linearization solution methods can be employed yet this does not
eliminate the eﬀects of second moments. That is, in solving for the linear equilibrium policy func-
tions, the vector of state variables includes the variance of technology shocks buﬀeting the capital
production sector. While Sims (2001) and Collard (forthcoming) have developed more general
solution methods that also permit the analysis of second moment eﬀects, the straightforward
extension of linearization methods employed here has appeal due to tractability.
The analysis of the equilibrium characteristics presents some interesting features. One of
the primary ﬁndings is that time varying uncertainty produces countercyclical bankruptcy rates.
In contrast, Carlstrom and Fuerst’s (1997) analysis of aggregate technology shocks produced the
counterfactual prediction of procyclical bankruptcy rates. Another prediction is that increases
in uncertainty will result in greater consumption but a reduction in investment. Hence, the
analysis presented here demonstrates that second moment eﬀects, not surprisingly, expand the
set of equilibrium characteristics; moreover, in some instances, ﬁrst and second moment eﬀects
move in opposite directions. This may have important consequences for understanding historical
business cycles. That is, historical business cycles can be diﬀerentiated by whether the shocks
are predominantly to aggregate supply or aggregate demand. Our analysis suggests that another
useful distinction may be the role of information; namely, is it the ﬁrst or second moments of the
2shocks hitting the economy that is dominant in inﬂuencing equilibrium characteristics.
These qualitative results are then examined quantitatively; speciﬁcally, we attempt to measure
changes in uncertainty by using forecast data from the Professional Forecasters Survey. Our
analysis, while quite preliminary in nature, suggests that the magnitude of second moment shocks
could be quite large relative to aggregate technology shocks. Hence, empirical analyses of models
of the broad credit channel that do not account for time-varying uncertainty may be understate
t h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h eﬁnancial intermediation sector in the economy.
The next section presents the model while the following section discusses equilibrium charac-
teristics. The ﬁnal section oﬀers some concluding comments.
2M o d e l
We employ the agency cost business cycle model of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) to address the
ﬁnancial intermediaries’ role in the propagation of productivity shocks and extend their analysis
by introducing time-varying uncertainty. Since, for the most part, the model is identical to that
in Carlstrom and Fuerst, the exposition of the model will be brief.
The model is a variant of a standard RBC model in which an additional production sector is
added. This sector produces capital using a technology which transforms investment into capital.
In a standard RBC framework, this conversion is always one-to-one; in the Carlstrom and Fuerst
framework, the production technology is subject to technology shocks. (The aggregate production
technology is also subject to technology shocks as is standard.) This capital production sector
is owned by entrepreneurs who ﬁnance their production via loans from a risk neutral ﬁnancial
intermediation sector - this lending channel is characterized by a loan contract with a ﬁxed interest
rate. (Both capital production and the loans are intra-period.) If a capital producing ﬁrm realizes
a low technology shock, it will declare bankruptcy and the ﬁnancial intermediary will take over
production; this activity is subject to monitoring costs. With this brief description, we now turn
3to an explicit characterization of the economy.
2.1 Households
The representative household is inﬁnitely lived and has expected utility over consumption ct and





t [ln(ct)+ν (1 − lt)] (1)
where E0 denotes the conditional expectation operator on time zero information, β ∈ (0,1), ν > 0,
and lt is time t labor. The household supplies labor, lt, and rents its accumulated capital stock, kt,
to ﬁrms at the market clearing real wage, wt, and rental rate rt, respectively, thus earning a total
income of wtlt +rtkt. The household then purchases consumption good from ﬁrms at price of one
(i.e. consumption is the numeraire), and purchases new capital, it, at a price of qt. Consequently,
his budget constraint is
wtlt +rtkt ≥ ct + qtit (2)
The law of motion for households’ capital stock is standard:
kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + it (3)
where δ ∈ (0,1) is the depreciation rate on capital.
The necessary conditions associated with the maximization problem include the standard labor-
leisure condition and the intertemporal eﬃciency condition associated with investment. Given
the functional form for preferences, these are:




















where Yt represents the aggregate output, θt denotes the aggregate technology shock, Kt denotes
the aggregate capital stock, Ht denotes the aggregate household labor supply, He
t denotes the
aggregate supply of entrepreneurial labor, and αK + αH + αHe =1 .4
The proﬁt maximizing representative ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions are given by the factor mar-
















t denotes the wage rate for entrepreneurial labor.
2.3 Entrepreneurs
A risk neutral representative entrepreneur’s course of action is as follows. To ﬁnance his project
at period t, he borrows resources from the Capital Mutual Fund according to an optimal ﬁnancial
contract. The entire borrowed resources, along with his total net worth at period t,a r et h e n
3 Note that we denote aggregate variables with upper case while lower case represents per-capita values. Prices
are also lower case.
4 As in Carlstrom and Fuerst, we assume that the entrepreneur’s labor share is small, in particular, αHe =0 .0001.
The inclusion of entrepreneurs’ labor into the aggregate production function serves as a technical device so that
entrepreneurs’ net worth is always positive, even when insolvent.
5invested into his capital creation project. If the representative entrepreneur is solvent after ob-
serving his own technology shock, he then makes his consumption decision; otherwise, he declares
bankruptcy and production is monitored (at a cost) by the Capital Mutual Fund.
2.4 Optimal Financial Contract
The optimal ﬁnancial contract between entrepreneur and the Capital Mutual Fund is described
by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). But for expository purposes as well as to explain our approach
in addressing the second moment eﬀect on equilibrium conditions, we brieﬂyo u t l i n et h em o d e l .
The entrepreneur has access to a stochastic technology that transforms it units of consumption
into ωtit units of capital. In Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), the technology shock ωt was assumed
to be distributed as i.i.d.w i t hE (ωt)=1 . While we maintain the assumption of constant mean,
we assume that the standard deviation is time-varying. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the standard





where ζ ∈ (0,1) and µt ∼ i.i.d with a mean of unity. The unconditional mean of the standard
deviation is given by ¯ σω. The realization of ωt is privately observed by entrepreneur — banks can
observe the realization at a cost of µit units of consumption.
The entrepreneur enters period t with one unit of labor endowment and zt units of capital.
Labor is supplied inelastically while capital is rented to ﬁrms, hence income in the period is
wt + rtzt. This income along with remaining capital determines net worth (denominated in units
of consumption) at time t:
nt = wt + zt (rt + qt (1 − δ)) (11)




(it −nt) capital goods to the lender, where rk is the interest rate on loans.







≡ ¯ ωt (12)
The optimal borrowing contract is given by the pair (i, ¯ ω) that maximizes entrepreneur’s return
subject to the lender’s willingness to participate (all rents go to the entrepreneur). Denoting the









ωφ(ω)dω − [1 − Φ(¯ ω)] ¯ ω
¸





ωφ(ω)dω +[ 1− Φ(¯ ω)] ¯ ω − Φ(¯ ω)µ
¸
which represents the lender’s fraction of expected capital output, Φ(¯ ω) is the bankruptcy rate so
that Φ(¯ ω)µ denotes monitoring costs. Also note that f (¯ ω)+g(¯ ω)=1− Φ(¯ ω)µ : the RHS is
the average amount of capital that is produced — this is split between entrepreneurs and lenders.
Hence the presence of monitoring costs reduces net capital production.7
5 This notation is imprecise in that it implies the distributions are time-invariant. That is, the c.d.f. should
be expressed as Φt (ωt) ≡ Φ(ωt;ωt−1,µt) with the p.d.f. expressed as φt (ωt) ≡ φ(ωt;ωt−1,µ t). For simplicity,
we suppress the time-notation.
6 The deriviative of this function is f0 (¯ ω)=Φ (¯ ω)−1. Thus, as Φ (¯ ω) ∈ [0,1],w eh a v ef0 (¯ ω) ≤ 0. That is, as the
lower bound for the realization of the technology shock (or the cutoﬀ bankruptcy rate) increases, the entrepreneur’s
output share goes down.
7 This suggests that monitoring costs are akin to investment adjustment costs - in fact, Carlstrom and Fuerst
demonstrate that this is the case. The important diﬀerence between this model and a model with adjustment
costs is that entrepreneurs’ net worth is an endogenous state variable that aﬀects the dynamics of the economy -
this feature is not present in an adjustment cost model.











φ(¯ ω)µ +f0 (¯ ω)
λ =
1 − Φ(¯ ω)
1 − Φ(¯ ω) −φ(¯ ω)µ
where λ is the shadow price of capital,8 and
∂ (.)
∂i
: qf (¯ ω)=−λ[1 −qg(¯ ω)]
Solving for q using the ﬁrst order conditions, we have
q =
·
(f (¯ ω)+g(¯ ω)) +






1 −Φ(¯ ω)µ +
φ(¯ ω)µf (¯ ω)
f0 (¯ ω)
¸−1
≡ [1 − D(¯ ω)]
−1
where D(¯ ω) can be thought of as the total default costs.
Equation (13) deﬁnes an implicit function ¯ ω(q) that is increasing in q, or the price of capital
that incorporates the expected bankruptcy costs. The price of capital, q,d i ﬀers from unity due to
the presence of the credit market friction. That is, to compensate for the bankruptcy (monitoring)
costs, there must be a premium on the price of capital. And this premium is set by the amount
of monitoring costs and the probability of bankruptcy. (Note that f0 (¯ ω)=Φ(¯ ω) − 1 < 0.)
8 Note that in the absence of monitoring costs, λ =1- the shadow price just covers the cost of capital production
8Finally, the incentive compatibility constraint implies
i =
1
(1 − qg(¯ ω))
n (14)
Equation (14) implies that investment is linear in net worth and deﬁnes a function that represents
the amount of consumption goods placed in to the capital technology: i(q,n).T h e f a c t t h a t t h e
function is linear implies that the aggregate investment function is well deﬁned.
2.5 Entrepreneur’s Consumption Choice
To rule out self-ﬁnancing by the entrepreneur (i.e. which would eliminate the presence of agency
costs), it is assumed that the entrepreneur discounts the future at a faster rate than the household.








t denotes entrepreneur’s consumption at date t, and γ ∈ (0,1). This new parameter, γ,w i l l
be chosen so that it oﬀsets the steady-state internal rate of return to entrepreneurs’ investment.
At the end of the period, the entrepreneur ﬁnances consumption out of the returns from the











Note that the expected return to internal fund is
qtf(¯ ωt)it
nt ; that is, the net worth of size nt is
leveraged into a project of size it, entrepreneurs keep the share of the capital produced and capital
is priced at qt consumption goods. Since these are intra-period loans, the opportunity cost is 1.9
9 As noted above, we require in steady-state 1=γ
qtf(¯ ωt)
(1−qtg(¯ ωt)).
9Consequently, the representative entrepreneur maximizes his expected utility function in equa-
tion (15) over consumption and capital subject to the law of motion for capital, equation (16),









The Capital Mutual Funds (CMFs) act as risk-neutral ﬁnancial intermediaries who earn no proﬁt
and produce neither consumption nor capital goods. There is a clear role for the CMF in this
economy since, through pooling, all aggregate uncertainty of capital production can be eliminated.
The CMF receives capital from three sources: entrepreneurs sell undepreciated capital in advance
of the loan, after the loan, the CMF receives the newly created capital through loan repayment
and through monitoring of insolvent ﬁrms, and, ﬁnally, those entrepreneur’s that are still solvent,
sell some of their capital to the CMF to ﬁnance current period consumption. This capital is then
sold at the price of qt units of consumption to households for their investment plans.
2.7 Equilibrium
There are four markets: labor markets for households and entrepreneurs, goods markets for con-
sumption and capital.
Ht =( 1−η)lt (17)
where η denotes the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy.
H
e
t = η (18)
10Ct + It = Yt (19)
where Ct =( 1− η)ct +ηce
t and It = ηit.
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt +It [1 −Φ(¯ ω)µ] (20)
A competitive equilibrium is deﬁned by the decision rules for {Kt+1,Z t+1,H t,He
t ,q t,n t,i t, ¯ ωt,c t,c e
t}
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ω,tµt+1 where µt ∼ i.i.d. with E (µt)=1 (29)
10 A more thorough presentation of the equilibrium conditions are presented in the Appendix.
113 Equilibrium Characteristics
3.1 Steady-state analysis
While our focus is primarily on the cyclical behavior of the economy, an examination of the steady-
state properties of the economy is useful for two reasons. First, by studying the interaction
between uncertainty (i.e. the variance of the technology shock aﬀecting the capital production
sector) and the steady-state, the intuition for how time-varying uncertainty aﬀects the cyclical
characteristics of the economy is improved. Second, it is important to point out that changes in the
second moment of technology shocks aﬀect the level of the economy - most notably consumption
and output. That is, since the cyclical analysis presented in the next section is characterized
in terms of deviations from steady-state, the impact of changes in uncertainty on the level of
economic activity is lost.11
For this analysis, we use, to a large extent, the parameters employed in Carlstrom and Fuerst’s
(1997) analysis. Speciﬁcally, the following parameter values are used:
Table 1: Parameter Values
βαδµ
0.99 0.36 0.02 0.25
Agents discount factor, the depreciation rate and capital’s share are fairly standard in RBC
analysis.12 The remaining parameter, µ, represents the monitoring costs associated with bank-
ruptcy. This value, as noted by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) is relatively prudent given estimates
of bankruptcy costs (which range from 20% (Altman (1984) to 36% (Alderson and Betker (1995)
of ﬁrm assets).
11 This statement is in reference to Lucas’s analysis of the cost of business cycles (Lucas (1987) in which the
trend and cycle are treated as distinct. In contrast, our analysis demonstrates that the cyclical behavior of the
economy has implications for the level of the steady-state. If one were using an endogenous growth model, cyclical
behavior may well have implications for the trend.
12 The fraction of households in the economy, η, is purely a normalization and does not inﬂuence equilibrium
steady-state. See Appendix 1 for details.
12The remaining parameters, (σ,γ), determine the steady-state bankruptcy rate (which we de-
note as br and is expressed in percentage terms) and the risk premium (denoted rp) associated
with bank loans.13 (Also, recall that γ is calibrated so that the rate of return to internal funds
is equal to 1
γ.) While Carlstrom and Fuerst found it useful to use the observed bankruptcy rate
to determine σ, for our analysis we treat σ and br as exogenous and examine the steady state
behavior of the economy under diﬀerent scenarios. In particular we consider the following four
economies:14
Table 2: Four Economies




Economy II 0.30 0.974 0.9538
Economy III 0.30 1.2 0.9458
Economy IV 0.35 1.8 0.9287
Hence Economy II departs from the Carlstrom and Fuerst economy by having greater uncer-
tainty in the technology shock but holds the bankruptcy rate at the same level used by Carlstrom






Economy III then permits the bankruptcy rate to increase by roughly a third. The ﬁnal economy
increases both the degree of technological uncertainty and the steady-state bankruptcy rate. To
examine the eﬀects of these changes, Table 3 reports the behavior of several key variables; for all
but two variables, these are presented as percentage deviations from the values in the Carlstrom
and Fuerst economy. The risk premium diﬀerential is reported as an absolute change while the
minimum technology shock deﬁned in the lending contract (i.e. ¯ ω)i nt h et h r e em o d i ﬁed economies
is reported
13 The equations deﬁning the steady-state are presented in the Appendix. This derivation also demonstrates that
the parameter η (the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy) is strictly a normalization and does not inﬂuence
equilibrium characteristics.
14 In Table 2, the values of γ are reported strictly for comparison. That is, once the values of σ and br are
speciﬁed, the value of γ is determined endogenously.
13Table 3: Steady-state behavior
(comparison to Carlstrom & Fuerst Economy)
variable Economy II Economy III Economy IV
c -0.19 -0.44 -1.18
k -0.51 -1.13 -3.05
rp 0.54 1.06 2.98
q 0.35 0.78 2.11
¯ ω15 0.47 0.49 0.45
z 28.4 25.0 28.4
n 28.7 25.7 30.4
Note that increases in uncertainty reduce the steady-state level of consumption and the aggre-
gate capital stock monotonically. For the high variance, high bankruptcy rate economy (Economy
IV), the reduction in steady-state consumption is greater than 1% - a non-trivial amount and sim-
ilar in magnitude to welfare losses reported by Lucas for moderate inﬂations (Lucas (2000)).
Clearly, more research is needed to examine the welfare consequences of uncertainty - in particu-
lar, one of the lessons of the equity premium puzzle literature is that logarithmic preferences are
not consistent with agents’ treatment of aggregate risk.
The risk premium associated with the lending contract as well as the price of capital are also
monotonically increasing in the variance and the bankruptcy rate. However, note that this is not
the case for the last three variables. In particular, the comparison between Economies II and III
shows that holding the variance of the technology shock constant but increasing the steady-state
bankruptcy rate results in a fall (again relative to Economy II) in both the entrepreneurs’ capital
stock (z) and net worth (n). This occurs despite the fact that the price of capital is greater and
reﬂects the impact that the greater bankruptcy rate has on the level of lending in the economy.
15 In the Carstrom and Fuerst economy, the minimum technology realization for solvency is: ¯ ω =0 .60.
14We now examine the cyclical behavior of the economy with time-varying uncertainty in the
capital production sector.
3.2 Cyclical Behavior
A sd e s c r i b e di nS e c t i o n2 ,e q s . (21)through (29) determine the equilibrium properties of the
economy. To analyze the cyclical properties of the economy, we linearize (i.e. take a ﬁrst-
order Taylor series expansion) of these equations around the steady-state values. This numerical
approximation method is standard in quantitative macroeconomics. What is not standard in this
model is that the second moment of technology shocks hitting the capital production sector will
inﬂuence equilibrium behavior and, therefore, the equilibrium policy rules. That is, linearizing
the equilibrium conditions around the steady-state typically imposes certainty equivalence so that
variances do not matter. In this model, however, the variance of the technology shock can be
treated as an additional state variable through its role in determining lending activities and, in
particular, the nature of the lending contract. Linearizing the system of equilibrium conditions
does not eliminate that role in this economy and, hence, we think that this is an attractive feature
of the model.
While the previous section analyzed the steady-state behavior of four diﬀerent economies, in
this section we employ the same parameters as in the Carlstrom and Fuerst model (Economy I
in the previous section). We depart from Carlstrom and Fuerst by relaxing the i.i.d. assumption
for the capital sector technology shock. This is reﬂe c t e di nt h el a wo fm o t i o nf o rt h es t a n d a r d







As in Carlstrom and Fuerst, the standard deviation of the technology shock ωt is, on average,
equal to 0.207. That is, we set ¯ σω =0 .207. We then examine two diﬀerent economies character-
15ized by the persistence in uncertainty, i.e. the parameter ζ. In the low persistence economy, we
set ζ =0 .05 while in the moderate persistence economy we set ζ =0 .90. The behavior of these
two economies is analyzed by examining the impulse response functions of several key variables
to a 1% innovation in σω. These are presented in Figures 1-3.
We ﬁrst turn to aggregate output and household consumption and investment. With greater
uncertainty, the bankruptcy rate increases in the economy (this is veriﬁed in Figure 2), which
implies that agency costs increase. The rate of return on investment for the economy therefore
falls. Households, in response, reduce investment and increase consumption and leisure. The
latter response causes output to fall. Note that the consumption and leisure response is increasing
in the degree of persistence. This is not the case, however, for investment - this is due to the
i n c r e a s ei nt h ep r i c eo fc a p i t a l( s e eF i g u r e2 )a n dr e ﬂects the behavior of entrepreneurs. This
behavior is understood after ﬁrst examining the lending channel.
The increase in uncertainty aﬀects, predictably, all three key variables in the lending channel:
the price of capital, the risk premium associated with loans and the bankruptcy rate. As already
mentioned, the bankruptcy rate increases and, in the high persistence economy, this increased rate
of bankruptcy lasts for several quarters. This result implies that the bankruptcy rate is counter-
cyclical in this economy; in contrast, in the analysis by Carlstrom and Fuerst the bankruptcy rate
was, counterfactually, procyclical.16 Their focus was on the eﬀects of innovation to the aggregate
technology shock and, because of the assumed persistence in this shock, is driven by the change
in the ﬁrst moment of the aggregate production shock. Our analysis demonstrates that second
moment eﬀe c t sm a yp l a yas i g n i ﬁcant role in these correlations over the business cycle. Further
research, both empirical and theoretical, in this area would be fruitful . Returning to the model,
the increased bankruptcy rate implies that the price of capital is greater and this increase lasts
longer in the high persistence economy. The same is true for the risk premium on loans.
16 In the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) model, a technology shock increases output and the demand for capi-
tal. The resulting increase in the price of capital implies greater lending activity and, hence, an increase in the
bankruptcy rate (and risk premia). Here, greater uncertainty results in greater bankruptcy rates even though
investment falls; since labor is also reduced, this produces countercyclical bankruptcy rates and risk premia.
16Figure 3 reports the consumption and net worth of entrepreneurs in the economies. In contrast
to all other variables, persistence has a dramatic qualitative eﬀect on entrepreneurs’ behavior.
With low persistence, entrepreneurs exploit the high price of capital to increase consumption: the
lack persistence provides no incentive to increase investment. Since the price of capital quickly
returns to its steady-state values, the increased consumption erodes entrepreneurs’ net worth. To
restore net worth to its steady-state value, consumption falls temporarily. The behavior in the
high persistence economy is quite diﬀerent: the price of capital is high and forecast to stay high
so investment increases dramatically. Initially, the investment is ﬁnanced by lower consumption,
but as entrepreneurs net worth increases (due to greater capital and a higher price of capital)
consumption also increases. This endogenous response by entrepreneurs is why, in the high
persistence economy, the initial fall in aggregate investment is not as great in the high persistence
economy.
3.2.1 Quantitative eﬀects
The discussion above demonstrates that changes in uncertainty have potentially important eﬀects
on the economy - but it does raise the question of whether these qualitative eﬀects are quanti-
tatively important. To answer this, we compare impulse response functions of the economy due
to an innovation of the aggregate technology shock, θt, and uncertainty, σω,t. Since all variables
are measured as percentage deviations from steady-state values, analyzing 1% innovations to both
shocks would, at ﬁrst glance, seem reasonable. Doing so, however, would treat as symmetrical
the likelihood of a shock of this magnitude for both innovations. To make the economically
meaningful comparison, an estimate of the empirical distribution for the two shocks is required.
For the aggregate technology shock, we use the Solow residual as measured by:
srt = yt − 0.36kt − 0.64ht (30)
17where all variables are measured in per-capita terms and expressed as logs. This series is then
linearly detrended and the resulting series identiﬁed as θt.17 While there are many sound reasons
why this construction of the aggregate technology shock is ﬂawed, the series can be viewed as a
noisy measure of the technology shock.18 Consequently, the volatility of this series is an upper
bound of the volatility of the true technology shock.
Measuring the volatility of σω is more problematic. Clearly there is no direct empirical analog
to this technology shock to capital production and, while calibration of the parameters of the
model employed the average risk premium on commercial paper and the bankruptcy rate, these
two series are endogenous and would represent very noisy measures of σω. Instead, we used the
data from the Professional Forecaster’s Survey (PFS) on the likelihood of various GDP growth
rate scenarios. That is, participants in the survey are asked to provide point forecasts for various
series such as GDP, unemployment, etc.; in addition, however, they are asked to provide the
probabilities associated with the following outcomes for GDP growth (denoted %∆y)
%∆y>6,5.9 > %∆y>5.0,4.9 > %∆y>4.0,3.9 > %∆y>3.0,
2.9 > %∆y>2.0,1.9 > %∆y>1.0,0.9 > %∆y>0.0,
−1.0 > %∆y>−0.1,−2.0 > %∆y>−1.1,−2.0 > %∆y
Using the probability weights (and identifying the midpoint of each interval as the outcome,
with 6.5% and -2.5% used for the extreme outcomes) the mean and standard deviation for each
forecaster can be constructed. We then used the average of these standard deviations as the
measure of σω.19
Figure 4 presents the empirical density functions for each series. Note that the volatility
of σω is much greater than that of θ (for the sample period, Sd(σω)=0 .072, Sd(θ)=0 .017).
17 A description of the data is provided in the Appendix.
18 Hoover and Salyer (1998) discuss at length the perils of using the Solow residual to do conditional forecasting
with real business cycle models.
19 Again, a complete description of the data and the transformations used are in the Appendix.
18Consequently, the probability mass associated with a ±1% innovation in θ is much larger than
that for the σω. To make comparison of the impulse response functions meaningful, we therefore
seek the value φ such that20
Pr(|θ| ≤ 0.01) = Pr(|σω| ≤ φ) (31)
Using the empirical density functions, the value that satisﬁes this condition is φ =0 .04;h e n c e ,i n
constructing the impulse response functions, the innovations for the uncertainty shock are 4 times
larger than that for the technology shock. The behavior of several key variables (in response to
positive innovations in the two shocks) are presented in Figure 5.
Note that in all cases, the response to a technology shock is greater than that to an increase in
uncertainty. This is not surprising in that a technology shock directly aﬀects factor productivity
while uncertainty aﬀects the economy through the endogenous response in the lending channel.
Yet, the quantitative eﬀects of an increase in uncertainty are not negligible - especially so for the
price of capital and the bankruptcy rate.21 Clearly more work is needed to assess the size of
the uncertainty shocks that aﬀect the economy. We view these results as suggestive that second
moment eﬀects do not have second order eﬀects.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The eﬀect of uncertainty as characterized by second moment eﬀects has been largely ignored in
quantitative macroeconomics due to the numerical approximation methods typically employed
during the computational exercise. The analysis presented here uses standard solution methods
(i.e. linearizing around the steady-state) but exploits features of the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
20 As described in the Appendix, all variables are measured as percentage devations from sample averages, hence
σω < 0 is well deﬁned.
21 It is worth noting that we modiﬁed preferences by introducing a simple form of habit persistence in consump-
tion. Our thinking was that this may change the behavior of the price of capital (through greater risk aversion)
and, therefore, magnify the changes due to greater uncertainty. This was not the case, however; speciﬁcally,
there was little change in any of the aggregate variables, most notably output and labor. Of course, the welfare
consequences of uncertainty would be aﬀectd.
19agency cost model of business cycles so that time varying uncertainty can be analyzed. While
development of more general solution methods that capture second moments eﬀects is encouraged,
we think that the intuitive nature of this model and its standard solution method make it an
attractive environment to study the eﬀects of time-varying uncertainty.
Our primary ﬁndings fall into four broad categories. First, we demonstrate that uncertainty
aﬀects the level of the steady-state of the economy so that welfare analysis of uncertainty that focus
entirely on the variability of output (or consumption) will understate the true costs of uncertainty.
Second, we demonstrate that time varying uncertainty results in countercyclical bankruptcy rates
-aﬁnding which is consistent with the data and opposite the result in Carlstrom and Fuerst.
Third, we show that persistence of uncertainty eﬀects both quantitatively and qualitatively the
behavior of the economy. Finally, the magnitude of shocks to uncertainty may be quantitatively
large; if so, second moment eﬀects do indeed matter for macroeconomic behavior. Together, these
results make a strong case for more research into the eﬀects that uncertainty has on aggregate
economic performance.
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225 Appendix:
5.1 Steady-state conditions in the Carlstrom and Fuerst Agency Cost
Model
We ﬁrst present the equilibrium conditions and express these in scaled (by the fraction of entre-
preneurs in the economy) terms. Then the equations are analyzed for steady-state implications.
As in the text, upper case variables denote aggregate wide while lower case represent household
variables. Preferences and technology are:
U (˜ c,1 −l)=l n ˜ c +ν (1 − l)
Y = θKα [(1 − η)l]
1−α−φ ηφ
Where η denotes the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy and θ is the technology shock.
Note that aggregate household labor is L =( 1− η)l while entrepreneurs inelastically supply one
unit of labor. We assume that the share of entrepreneur’s labor is approximately zero so that the
production function is simply
Y = θKα [(1 −η)l]
1−α
This assumption implies that entrepreneurs receive no wage income (see eq. (9) in C&F.
There are nine equilibrium conditions:
The resource constraint
(1−η)˜ ct + ηce
t +ηit = Yt = θtKα




η and h =
(1−η)
η l,t h e ne q (32) c a nb ew r i t t e na s :
ct + ce

















L a wo fm o t i o no fa g g r e g a t ec a p i t a ls t o c k
Kt+1 =( 1−δ)Kt +ηit [1 − Φ(¯ ωt)µ]
Dividing by η yields the scaled version:
kt+1 =( 1−δ)kt +it [1 −Φ(¯ ωt)µ] (35)













24Dividing both sides by
1−η





























1 − qtg(¯ ωt)
(38)
Where nt is entrepreneur’s net worth.
Determination of net worth
ηnt = Zt
h




o r ,i ns c a l e dt e r m s :
nt = zt
£





Note that zt denotes (scaled) entrepreneur’s capital.










































1 −qt+1g (¯ ωt+1)
¶¾
(41)
5.2 Deﬁnition of Steady-state
Steady-state is deﬁned by time-invariant quantities:
ct =ˆ c,ce
t =ˆ ce,k t = ˆ k, ¯ ωt =ˆ ω,h t = ˆ h,qt =ˆ q,zt =ˆ z,nt =ˆ n,it =ˆ ı
So there are nine unknowns. While we have nine equilibrium conditions, the two intertemporal
eﬃciency conditions become identical in steady-state since C&F impose the condition that the
internal rate of return to entrepreneur is oﬀset by their additional discount factor:
γ
µ
ˆ qf (ˆ ω)
1 − ˆ qg(ˆ ω)
¶
=1 (42)
26This results in an indeterminacy - but there is a block recursiveness of the model due to the
calibration exercise. In particular, we demonstrate that the risk premium and bankruptcy rate
determine (ˆ ω,σ) - these in turn determine the steady-state price of capital.
From eq.(36) we have:
ˆ q =
αβ
1 −β (1 −δ)
ˆ kα−1ˆ h1−α =
αβ





















Note that these three equations are normally (i.e. in a typical RBC framework) used to ﬁnd
steady-state
³
ˆ k,ˆ h, ˆ c
´
-b e c a u s eˆ q =1 . Here since the price of capital is endogenous, we have four
unknowns.
From eq. (39) and eq. (36) we have
ˆ n =ˆ z
µ








From eq. (40) and the restriction on the entrepreneur’s additional discount factor (eq. (42)),
we have














27We have the two conditions from the ﬁnancial contract
ˆ q =
1







1 − ˆ q(1−Φ(ˆ ω)µ −f (ˆ ω))
ˆ n (50)
Finally, we have the resource constraint:
ˆ c +ˆ ce +ˆ ı = ˆ kαˆ h1−α (51)
The eight equations (43),(44),(45),(46),(47),(49),(50),(51) are insuﬃcient to ﬁnd the nine
unknowns. However, the risk premium, denoted as ζ,i sd e ﬁned by the following
ˆ qˆ ω
ˆ ı
ˆ ı − ˆ n
= ζ (52)
But we also know (from eq.(50) that
ˆ n
ˆ ı







substituting from the previous expression yields
ˆ ω = ζg(ˆ ω) (53)
Let κ = bankruptcy rate — this observable also provides another condition on the distribution.
28That is, we require:
Φ(ˆ ω)=κ (54)
The two equations eq.(53) and eq. (54) can be solved for the two unknowns - (ˆ ω,σ).B y v a r y i n g
the bankruptcy rate and the risk premium, we can determine diﬀerent levels of uncertainty (σ)
and the cutoﬀ point (ˆ ω).
Note that the price of capital in steady-state, is a function of (ˆ ω,σ) as determined by eq. (49).
The other preference parameter, γ is then determined by eq. (42). Once this is determined, the re-
maining unknowns:
³
ˆ c, ˆ ce,ˆ h,ˆ ı,ˆ k,ˆ z,ˆ n
´
are determined by eqs. (43),(44),(45),(46),(48),(50),(51).
5.2.1 Description of Data
In constructing the Solow residual as deﬁn e di ne q .(30), the following series were obtained from
the US-ECON data set provided by Haver Analytics.
1. GDPH - Gross domestic product (seasonally adjusted at annual rates, billions of chain-
weighted 1992 dollars)
2. FNH - Fixed, non-residential investment (seasonally adjusted at annual rates, billions of
chain-weighted 1992 dollars)
3. LHTNAGRA - Aggregate hours, wage & salary workers on non-agricultural payrolls (sea-
sonally adjusted at annual rates, millions of hours)
4. LNT20N - Civilian noninstitutional population, both sexes, 20 years and over (thousands,
non-seasonally adjusted)
5. EPND - ﬁxed private non-residential capital, billions of dollars.
To construct a quarterly capital stock series for the sample period 1982.1-2002.2, the law of
motion for capital was used with fnhidentiﬁed as investment and the initial capital stock identiﬁed
as 1981.4 value of epnd. The depreciation rate was assumed to be 0.020.
29The Professional Forecaster’s Survey data was obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s website. A complete description of the survey can be found there; in addition, a
bibliography of articles that have used this data is also available.
The probabilities attached to various scenarios for real GDP growth over the sample period were
used. There were two changes that occurred in the survey in 1992: a ﬁner partitioning of possible
outcomes was introduced and the forecast was changed to GDP growth from GNP growth. The
latter change is ignored for our purposes while the former makes comparison of the forecasts
somewhat problematic. The survey participants were asked to provide probabilities for the
following outcomes (all in percentage terms) in the two periods:
1982 −1991 :> 6,4 to 5.9,2 to 3.9,0 to 1.9,−2 to −0.1,<−2
1992 −current :> 6,5 to 5.9,4 to 4.9,3 to 3.9,2 to 2.9,1 to 1.9,
0 to 0.9,−1 to − 0.1,−2 to −1.1,<−2
The ﬁner partitioning post 1992 resulted in smaller variances over this period. Hence, to make
a consistent series over the entire sample period, standard deviations in each period (the average
of the forecasters’ standard deviations) were expressed as percentage deviations from the mean in




Figure 1:  Response of Output, Consumption, and Investment 
Low and High Persistence Economies 
 








































Figure 2:  Response of Price of Capital, Risk Premia, and Bankruptcy Rate 
Low and High Persistence Economies 
 










































Figure 3:  Response of Entrepreneur’s Consumption and Net Worth 































































 Figure 5:  Response to Technology ( ) θ  and Uncertainty ( ) ω σ Shock  
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